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THE VIABILITY OF SAUDI ARABIAN INDUSTRIAL 
DIVERSIFICATION EFFORTS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
DECLINING GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 
by 
ROBERT E. LOONEY * 
Introduction 
Given the probability that Saudi Arabia will not be able to significantly 
increase its oil revenues in the near future, the major problem facing the 
government will be how best to utilize its dwindling oil revenues to gener-
ate positive overall rates of economic growth, while at the same time 
meeting to the fullest extent possible the basic needs of the majority of the 
population. Clearly any future growth strategy must involve devising means 
whereby the private sector will assume a more important role in expanding 
not only output, but perhaps more importantly in sustaining a level of 
effective domestic demand to stave off any further recessionary tendencies 
stemming from reduced government expenditures. This is especially critical 
in the non-hydrocarbon manufacturing sector, which is almost totally depend-
ent on the local market for sales. 
In this context, the main purpose of the analysis below is to examine 
the consequences of declining oil revenues for the Saudi Arabian economy. 
In particular, the paper is interested in examining several alternative auster-
ity strategies open to the government. In which general areas of government 
expenditure - consumption (current), investment (infrastructure) or defense 
(military) - would budgetary cuts be the least disruptive on the non-oil 
manufacturing sector and in what sense? 
* Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (U.S.A.). 
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Post-Keynesian Assumptions 
For this purpose, a series of Post-Keynesian type relationships were 
estimated. These examine the various impacts on the economy, and particu-
larly the manufacturing sector stemming from the different classes of govern-
ment expenditure - investment, consumption, and defense. The Post-Keynes-
ian approach 1 is much too eclectic to adequately summarize here. Howev-
er, one of its attractive features for examining government policy in Saudi 
Arabia is that the approach offers a framework for examining the relation-
ship between the components of public sector demand, income distribution 
and sectoral output. 
In place of the relative price variable which is the focal point of a 
neoclassical analysis, Post-Keynesian theory makes investment the key deter-
minant of the economic aggregates listed above. This follows from an under-
lying belief that in a dynamic, expanding economy, the income effects 
produced by investment and other sources of growth far outweigh the 
substitution effects resulting from price movements. That is changes in 
demand, both aggregate and sectoral, are due more to changes in income 
than to changes in relative prices. 
Perhaps more importantly, Saudi Arabia possesses a number of struc-
tural characteristics that would seem to preclude an automatic equilibration 
of most markets at or near full employment 2 : 
1. Government expenditures play a pervasive role in the economy, account-
ing in recent years for well over half of aggregate demand. 
2. Financial markets are underdeveloped, with the interest rate playing an 
insignificant role due to Islamic codes concerning usury. 
3. The relatively low population base puts some limit on the size of the 
market and competition. 
4. A sectoral imbalance is dominated by oil in accounting for real output 
and by services in respect to employment. This situation creates an environ-
ment whereby a large gap exists between income creation and demand 
generation that must be closed by government expenditures. The implica-
tions of this situation in terms of markets are: 
1 Cf. EICHNER and KREGEL (1975). 
2 NAG! (1982, p. 13). 
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(a) A price mechanism that is way above the real value, especially in 
real estate, land and non industrial properties, and 
(b) A wage mechanism that is tied to inflation and oil revenue and is 
only remotely connected with real productivity. 
In sum, a Post-Keynesian approach was selected for the analysis below 
because it is capable of explicitly considering, given the pervasive role of 
government expenditures (as opposed to market-determined allocation~), 
how economic performance can be improved over the extrapolation of short 
run trends. 
Fiscal Patterns 
Budgetary revenue and expenditure increased steadily up to 1974, 
except for 1967 /68 when dislocation following the Israeli-Arab war affected 
all economies in the region. However, the 1973/74 and 1979 oil price 
jumps, world recession and fluctuations in the world demand for oil, and 
political instability and warfare in the Gulf have led to sizeable year to year 
fluctuations in budgetary receipts compared to expectations. 
Although the general trend remained buoyant until 1981/82 in 
1977 /7 8 and 197 8 /7 9, slight budget deficits followed unexpectedly low oil 
revenues, whereas expenditure arid revenue both rose higher than projected 
during the next two years. The 1982/83 budget was the first in which an 
absolute decline in revenue was projected, the objective being to arrive at a 
balance, while in 1983/84 a planned deficit of SR35 billion was budgeted 
for the first time in recent history. 
In 1984/85 the planned deficit was.increased to SR46 billion (Table 
1) with budget revenue and expenditure figures SR214 billion and SR260 
billion respectively. The 1985/86 budget was supposed to balance at SR200 
billion, but ended with a SR50 billion deficit. The 1986/87 budget was not 
published in March 1986 as due, because of uncertain revenue forecasts. 
Monthly disbursements continued on the basis of average spending in 
1984/85. A new budget was finally released at the end of December 1986 
to cover the 1987 calendar year. This projected revenue at SRll 7 billion, 
compared with SR340 billion envisag~d in the budget for 1981/82. 
Over the same period, the government had reduced government spend-
ing from SR298 billion to SR160 billion, a significant achievement, but 
not enough to close the deficit gap. In 1988 another large budget deficit was 
projected, but the government acknowledged the dwindling size of its budg-
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SAUDI ARABIA: GOVERNMENT BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1984-1988 
(SR million) 
'•1-' 
1984 1985 1986 1987 
y[, ,, 
Total Revenue 225,00 214,000 200,000 106,926 
Oil Revenue 164,496 164,500 154,250 74,183 
Other Revenue 60,504 49,600 45,750 32,743 
Total Expenditure 260,000 260,000 200,000 159,646 
Human Resources 27,736 30,413 24,533 23,689 
Transport 24,950 22,175 14,497 10,904 
Economic Development 13,202 12,533 9,081 6,615 
Health 13,591 16,134 12,892 11,094 
-Infrastructure 9,582 9,833 6,924 4,299 
Municipal Services 19,070 17,063 11,890 8,110 
Defense 75,565 79,892 63,956 54,226 
Public Administration 47,218 43,928 38,584 30,974 
Govt Lending Inst. 20,000 17,500 9,300 3,590 


















Balance -35,000 -45,900 - -52,7~0 -35,900 
Balance - - - - 30,000 
. 
Source: SAUDI ARABIAN MONETARY AGENCY, Annual Report, various issues. 
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et reserves by launching a local borrowing scheme to cover a substantial 
portion of the revenue shortfall. Import duties were also raised in an at-
tempt to generate more non-oil revenue, but other measures such as tax 
increases were rescinded following public protest. 
As well as declining oil revenues the government has had to contend 
with a drop in overseas investment income, which has resulted from a fall in 
international interest rates and a reduction in the size of the government's 
overseas assets from around $150 billion in 1982 to less (estimated) than 
$60 billion by the end of 1988 3 • 
One of the main problems for the government is that current expendi-
ture has proved very difficult to pa~e back; there are huge costs involved in 
running and maintaining the activities established by development project 
capital inputs - in social services as well as physical infrastructure. Defence 
expenditure remains a major budget item. 
3 RICHIE (1987, p. 169). 
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In terms of recently released figures, in 1986 (March-December), ac-
tual domestic revenue was only SR16.5 billion, government domestic spend-
ing was SR88.2 billion, and government direct foreign exchange spending 
was SR3 7 .6 billion. By the end of 1987 central government reserve ac-
counts lodged with SAMA had fallen to SR78 billion, down from SR118.5 
billion at the end of 1986. This SR40.5 billion drop probably reflects fairly 
accurately the actual size of the 1987 budget deficit, against a budgeted 
SR52.7 billion. If the budgeted 1988 deficit of SR36 billion had been fully 
financed from reserves rather than borrowing, these government deposits 
might have been expected to have halved by the end of 1988 to less than 
$10 billion. 
The growing government preoccupation with cutting its budget deficit 
is being translated into a number of schemes devised to tap the savings of 
state organizations (the Pension Fund has around SR60 billion) and the 
private sector. Expenditure rationalization and efficiency increases have also 
been attempted but are proving elusive targets. 
Government bond issues are the most obvious example of attempts to 
tap sources of savings other than the government's own dwindling reserves, 
the more so since various amendments to the offering terms have been 
introduced. These changes have gradually widened the groups of potential 
end-investors. Before the bonds were even offered to banks, it is estimated 
that some SR14 billion may have.been placed with the government Pension 
Fund. The bonds were then offered to banks, some of which gained permis-
sion to place them in a package of national assets offered to private invest-
ors in the form of a unit trust. 
Finally, towards the end of September 1988 the Saudi Arabian Mone-
tary Agency (SAMA) announced that banks would be able to sell the bonds 
directly to the Saudi public in minimum tranches of SRl million; purchasers 
would get a certificate of purchase rather than the bonds themselves as the 
banks would still collect interest from them, and would be forbidden to sell 
them on to non-Saudis. Firm details on the number and success of the bond 
offerings are scarse, which seems to confirm both that the bank's take has 
been lower than hoped for, and that the scheme itself is still seen as rather 
controversial. 
The success of the government borrowing program will be judged not 
just by the levels of commercial bank and private sector subscriptions to 
tranche issue, but also by the extent to which these investors are prepared to 
repatriate funds from abroad to purchase the bonds. As yet there is no firm 
evidence to show whether the purchases are being financed from domestic 
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Figures recently published by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 4 
provide an insight into the extent of the government's problem, and the 
nature of commercial banks' net foreign asset position. In the ten month 
interval between budgets in 1986, . direct government foreign exchange 
spending stood at SR37.6 billion, domestic spending at SR88.2 billion, 
domestic revenue at SR16.5 billion, and net domestic cash flows (defined as 
domestic spending minus domestic revenues) at SR71.7 billion. If the gov-
ernment could cover its foreign exchange spending with foreign currency 
repatriated via the bond issues, it would mean that government oil revenue 
and overseas investment income could all be put at the disposal of SAMA to 
meet private sector foreign exchange demand. 
On the other hand, if government borrowings are to be covered by 
riyals savings, and could therefore be classified in the same vein as domestic 
revenue, it becomes clear that this method of borrowing will decrease the 
net domestic cash flow, along with the stimulus that the government budget 
has traditionally given to the economy. This might be expected eventually to 
lead to less demand for foreign exchange throughout the economy, rather 
than to bring about an increase in foreign exchange availability. Funding the 
bond issues from domestic resources thus has a much clearer deflationary 
impact, which might be expected to hurt the independent growth of the 
private sector. 
As far as the commercial. banks are concerned, the true extent of their 
net foreign assets position is often overstated, by a tendency not to nest out 
residents' foreign assets denominated in Saudi riyals. In mid-1987 when 
Saudi commercial banks' foreign assets are standing at SR88.6 billion, and 
foreign liabilities at SR16.8 billion, giving a net foreign asset position of 
SR 71.8 billion, the banks were also holding SR28 billion in residents' 
foreign currency deposits, while their net foreign position in Saudi riyals 
was SR20.6 billion. In other words, their true net foreign assets position 
could be more correctly stated at only SR23 .2 billion. 
The figure for the size of the offshore riyal market is only reported in 
the SAMA Annual Report, but it might be assumed to have grown in 
1987 /88 following the removal of withholding Tax. Assuming the net fig-
ure for this market has not risen to SR25 billion, a truer net foreign asset 
figure for Saudi commercial banks would seem to be SR 17. 7 billion -
insufficient to cover more than half the planned 1988 budget deficit. It is 
clear then that the commercial banks alone cannot be expected to cover the 
budget deficit in foreign currency, or at least not until a clearer line of the 
• Annual Report (1986, 1987). 
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riyal persuades local depositors to switch out of foreign currency deposits. 
It is clear then that the government will have great difficulties in 
raising sufficient funds to continue expenditures at recent levels. Other 
methods, expenditure reductions and/ or redirection seem a more realistic 
solution to the country's budgetary problems. 
Budgetary Strategies 
At first sight, the most logical austerity program would be one of 
concentrating on a selective reduction in defense expenditure allowing re-
sources to be freed up to finance (more productive) government programs. 
Defense alone accounts for 25-35 percent of the national budget. As noted 
above (Table 1) despite the decline in oil revenues, defense expenditures 
have fallen only moderately. 
In relative terms, the kingdom ranks first in the world in military 
expenditures per capita, and in military expenditures per soldier. In contrast 
the country ranks fifth in education expenditure per capita, and thirteenth in 
health expenditures per capita '. 
It is not at all clear how much of the allocations to defense are in 
excess of what is needed on purely strategic grounds. Although Saudi Ara-
bia has spent massively on developing an extensive military infrastructure 
and in purchasing the most sophisticated hardware available, the rationales 
for this expenditure have been articulated in only the most general terms. 
These are to enable the kingdom to protect its extensive borders from 
regional or superpower incursions and to ensure internal security 6 • In terms 
of constraints, the country's purchasing program has been limited only by 
the lack of absorptive capacity, trained manpower and the willingness of the 
U .. S. to supply certain weapons systems. 
The first dilemma therefore facing the Saudi authorities is whether the 
country can justify the high costs of military expenditures when a distinct 
possibility exists that cut backs in defense could free up sufficient funds to 
offset most of the budgetary cuts in the non defense area brought about by 
the oil price declines. 
Along these lines, classical theory would predict on the basis of re-
source allocation that increases in defense will decrease investment and/or 
civilian consumption and thus reduce _industrial output. Increased military 
' SIVARD (1985, pp. 40-41). 
6 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (August 1986, p. 6). 
24 ROBERT E. LOONEY 
burdens would, in this situation, have to be justified on the basis of other 
social welfare gains such as an increase in collective security. Keynesian 
theory, on the other hand, suggests that in the presence of inadequate 
effective demand the operation of the income multiplier would result in an 
increase in industrial output, resulting from additional defense expenditures. 
Of course one could always argue that expenditure on either consumption 
or investment would have a greater domestic expenditure multiplier on 
private sector incomes and rates of production than that produced by mili-
tary expenditures. Thus, there are purely economic rationales for increased 
military spending. Whether or not military expenditures have a positive 
economic impact relative to other sources of demand is ultimately an empiri-
cal question 7 • 
The second budgetary dilemma currently facing the Saudi authorities 
concerns the wisdom of further expanding the kingdom's infrastructure. 
During the last decade, Saudi Arabia has had perhaps the largest ever 
program of investment in transport and related infrastructure. Since the 
expansion in oil revenues in 197 3 /7 4 the country invested in a wide variety 
of programs to expand not only its road network, but sea and air ports as 
well. In large part, the rationale for this program was based on the presump-
tion that the cost reducing impact of this investment would make private 
investment much more profitable, and thus stimulate a major expansion in 
private sector output. 
The possibility that public sector investment in infrastructure can stim-
ulate not only increased levels of private sector investment, but overall 
increases in industrial output as well, has long intrigued economists. This 
possibility is clearly suggested by infrastructure's key role in Hirschman's 
unbalanced development strategy 8 • 
Tersely put, Hirschman advocated that in countries where the private 
sector is somewhat squeamish about risk-taking, the government could stim-
ulate private sector capital formation, and follow on increases in industrial 
output through massive investments in such areas as transportation, and 
energy thereby reducing the costs of commercial production. While not 
explicitly acknowledged, Hirschman's notions of imbalance through massive 
investments in infrastructure underlie Saudi Arabia's development strategy 9 • 
In terms of financing, the Saudi authorities have spent more on infras-
tructure in the last fifteen years than any country in history over a similar 
time period. Since 1970 when the _country initiated its first development 
7 DE.GER and SMITH (1985, p. 6). 
8 HIRSCHMAN (1958) . 
• LooNEY and FREDERIKSEN (1985). 
.. 
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plan, the government with the completion of the Third Plan in 1985 had 
allocated approximately 375 billion riyals to development infrastructure 
(during most of this period the exchange rate was around 3 .5 Rls. to the 
U.S. dollar). 
In terms of the focus of the present study, the relevant question is 
whether the Saudi Arabian government's strategy of infrastructure led invest-
me~t has been successful in the Hirschman sense i.e., has it resulted in 
distinctly higher levels of industrial output over and above the levels likely 
to exist in the absence of these programs? If not, what impacts have 
been associated with infrastructural investment and have these effects been 
superior to those that would have resulted from either consumption or 
military expenditures? 
The third major area of budgetary concern involves the role of govern-
ment consumption in Saudi Arabia. How the government divides its expen-
ditures between consumption (current) and other types of allocations has a 
significant impact on the relative incomes of the middle- and high- income 
groups in the kingdom 10 • 
The mechanisms the Saudi Authorities have for transferring oil income 
to the private sector are: (1) subsidies of various types, (2) the wages and 
salaries the government pays its employees, and (3) profits generated in the 
private sector. The first two mechanisms involving government consumption 
are fairly self explanatory. The third, however, requires some elaboration. 
Since the government is the most important buyer and investor in the 
kingdom, a major source of private income is the profits earned by Saudis 
acting as middlemen between the government and foreign firms in the 
purchase of imported goods or large construction contracts 11 • In addition, 
many of these businessmen own large construction firms and act as contrac-
tors themselves. 
How the government spends its oil revenues can therefore have a 
significant impact on the relative incomes of the middle- and high-income 
groups in the kingdom. A major middle income group is made up of profes-
sionals and administrators employed in the public sector. By raising the 
salaries of these employees, the government can easily improve the position 
of the middle class. On the other hand, an increase in purchases of military 
hardware and expansion of government investment expenditures at the ex-
pense of public sector salaries would' increase the relative income of mid-
dlemen and contractors. 
Government expenditure may also affect the distribution of income 
10 KAVOURSSI (1983, pp. 74-75). 
11 BEBALWI (1987). 
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through its differential impact on various income groups. Here, the presump-
tion is that the upper income groups and middlemen will be in a better 
situation to avoid the inflation tax relative to their middle income, adminis-
trator counterparts. We should, therefore, expect to find that inflation tends 
to reduce the over all level of consumption, while quite possibly increasing 
private investment (on the presumption that the upper income groups do 
most of the investment in the kingdom, and that a large share of this 
investment is financed from income rather than the financial markets). 
Unfortunately in testing these assertions about the impact of govern-
ment activity on the private sector, we do not have reliable data on changes 
(or for any year for that matter) in income distribution over time. Implicitly, 
however, the analysis below assumes that government expenditures affect 
income distribution as manifested in the over all impact it has on aggregate 
private investment and consumption. Based on the assumption that middle 
and lower income groups account for a relatively high share of consumption 
and a low share of investment, movements in these two aggregates as 
affected by government expenditures should provide a general picture of the 
direction in which the country's income distribution has changed over time. 
Operational Definitions 
In order to gain some insight into the manner in which public expendi-
tures - infrastructure, consumption and defense - impact on various facets 
of the Saudi economy, several Post-Keynesian type equations were first 
estimated examining the impact of these allocations on private consumption 
and investment. Here the greatest difficulty involves the lack of data as to 
the value and composition of the kingdom's stock of infrastructure. In 
particular official Saudi data on government investment contains both infra-
structural and non-infrastructural type expenditures. Conceivably the cost 
reducing effect of the infrastructure component of government investment 
could be offset by the potential (inflationary) crowding out of private sector 
activity stemming from the non-infrastructural component. 
To avoid these potential problems it was first necessary to separate out 
and estimate the independent effects of the different categories of public 
investment. Since the raw data itself does not allow these distinctions to be 
made, a proxy measure for the infrastructural and non-infrastructural com-
ponents of government investment had to be developed. Operationally this 
involved making a distinction between types of public investment on the 
basis of whether or not that investment was expected. 
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Expected investment was assumed to be depicted by the trend in 
government investment 12 • Again, it is assumed that expected public invest-
ment, GIE, reflects investment in infrastructure. Similarly, transitory govern-
ment investment was assuqied to be depicted by that component of public 
investment that was unexpected. Operationally, unexpected public invest-
ment (GIU) was defined as the difference between the actual (realized) level 
of government investment (GI) and what was expected (GIE). Clearly, the 
basic assumption underlying these proxies is that infrastructure investment 
is an on going process that moves slowly over time and cannot be changed 
very rapidly. 
A final factor that needs to be taken into account is the potential 
problem of real or physical crowding out. It is a well-accepted proposition 
that in Saudi Arabia absorptive capacity has been a problem, particularly in 
the early oil boom years 13 • By definition, public sector expenditures can 
result in crowding out if it utilizes physical and financial resources that 
would otherwise go to the private sector. Furthermore, the financing of 
public sector investment, whether through taxes, issuance of debt or infla-
tion will lower the resources available for the private sector thus creating a 
situation that may depress private investment activity. Operationally a nega-
tive sign on unexpected government investment ( GIU) can be assumed to 
reflect crowding out of private sector investment due to excessive alloca-
tions to non-infrastructural uses. · 
In a similar manner, proxies were developed for permanent and transi-
tory government consumption, with permanent consillnption ( GCE) reflec-
tive of long term trends in government salaries and subsidies and transitory 
government consumption ( GCU) reflecting short term adjustments to chang-
ing revenues. 
Expected military expenditures (MEE) are reflective of long term weap-
ons acquisition and infrastructure development, while unexpected military 
expenditures (MEU) were assumed to reflect short run responses to changes 
in the kingdom's perceived security situation. 
Impact of Government Expenditures 
The Post-Keynesian approach towards investment and output is much 
more eclectic than its neo-classical counterpart. Here, investors rather than 
12 The trend in expenditures was estimated using a linear regression with time. Expected 
expenditures were calculated as in BLEJER and KHAN (1985). 
" LOONEY (1982). 
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attempting to bridge the gap between the ex1stmg capital stock and an 
optimal one, are seen as largely responding to changes in expectations 
concerning future profitability. 
Post-Keynesians also emphasize the importance of credit availability in 
enabling business firms to bridge any gap between their desired level of 
discretionary spending and the current rate of cash inflow. Of course Post-
Keynesian models have been developed largely for the advanced, mature 
industrial countries where sophisticated financial systems exist, together 
with central banks capable of altering such variables as the level and struc-
ture of interest rates. 
Adapting the Post-Keynesian approach to the Saudi Arabian situation : 
entails making a number of assumptions as to the relevant indicators used to 
reflect perceived changes in business profitability: 
1. Subsidies either direct or indirect by the government to the private sector, 
while very important are, given the data, somewhat difficult to pin down. 
For purposes of estimates here, they are assumed to vary more or less in line 
with the amount of distributed loans (INDCR) from the Saudi Industrial 
Development Fund. 
2. The expected rate of inflation (INFE) may affect investment and output 
decisions in manufacturing, particularly as anticipated increases in future 
prices may increase the perceived profitability of non-traded activities rela-
tive to manufacturing. This is one aspect of the so called "Dutch Disease" 
effect 14 • 
3. Credit tightness (CBPSPE) is depicted as the expected level of real 
commercial bank credit, and is computed in a manner similar to the ex-
pected levels of investment described above. Presumably increases in the 
expected level of credit would be reflective of easing credit conditions. 
4. In a Post-Keynesian framework crowding out of private sector activity can 
result from excessive military expenditures (MEU), government consump- ; 
tion (GCU) in addition to non-infrastructural investment (GIU). 
• ! 
Impact on Inflation 
Operationally, the impact of infrastructure investment on inflation is 
,. LooNEY (1988/89). 
SAUDI ARABIAN INDUSTRIAL DIVERSIFICATION EFFORTS 29 
modeled by a blending of the Hirschman/Voigh 15 and Glover/Simon 16 
approach towards impacts stemming from the infrastructure development 
process. If infrastructure plays a role similar to that envisaged by Hirschman 
and Voigh, we should expect to find the resulting potential increase in the 
rate of return on various commercial activities inducing the private sector to 
increase its level of real output. While likely to be inflationary in the short 
run, over time, this should result in a closing of the inflationary gap created 
by the infusion of purchasing power associated with the construction phase 
of the infrastructure expansion program. 
On the other hand, if the Glover and Simon view of the role of 
infrastructure is more appropriate in explaining private sector behavior, we 
would expect the private sector's expectations of future government actions, 
including likely extensions ef the country's infrastructure to play a predomi-
nant role in shaping its decisions to expand output and or investment. 
However, the new higher level of output,· depending on the way it is fi-
nanced, may result in an over-expansion of the money supply neutralizing 
the longer run anti-inflationary effect of the induced expansion of infra-
structure. 
In the model that follows attempts are made to incorporate the infla-
tio~ary effects of infrastructure irriplicit in both the Hirschman/Voigh and 
Glover/Simon approaches. 
The model used to examine the differential impact of government 
expenditures on inflation in Saudi Arabia incorporates the considerations 
outlined above: 
1. In particular proxies for "permanent expenditures", the expected level of 
government investment (GIE), consumption (GCE), and defense (MEE) 
were included in the regression equation to determine the longer run infla-
tionary effect (if any) associated with the expanding role of the government 
in the economy. 
2. Shorter run impacts of government expenditures on inflation were mod-
eled using the measure of unexpected increases - GIU, investment, GCU 
consumption and MEU, defense defined above. 
3. The impact of world price movements on the Saudi Arabian price level 
was included to reduce any biases stemming from the period of world 
" VOIGH (1974). 
16 GLOVER and SIMON (1974). 
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inflation occurring in the mid to late 1970s. Since Saudi Arabia does not 
publish figures on the price of imports, this variable was proxied by the 
International Monetary Fund's industrial countries' export price index. This 
index was lagged one year (INFWL) to allow changes in import prices to 
work themselves through the domestic cost structure. 
4. Inflation is also assumed to be a function of inflationary expectations 
(NODEE). As with the other expected values derived above, this factor was 
proxied by regressing the non-oil price deflator on its value in the previous 
year, and using each year's predicted value in the regression equation. 
5. The potential impact of excess money balances on the non-oil price 
deflator was treated by including the money supply (Ml) in the regression 
equation. 
6. The reduction in inflationary pressures stemming from increased real 
supplies of goods and services was proxied by non-oil GDP (YNO). 
In terms of expected signs, the inflationary impact of infrastructure 
was assumed negative, while government consu~ption and military expendi-
tures by creating demand, but not augmented supplies were assumed to be 
positive. Unexpected values for all three types of expenditure were as-
sumed, for similar reasons, to have a positive impaC:t on inflation. 
Finally, to test the generality of the model regressions were performed 
using both the non-oil GDP deflator (NODF) and the consumer price index 
(CPI). 
Summarizing the above in equation form (with expected signs): 
where: 
INF = f [INFE ( + ), INFWL ( + ), Ml ( + ), YNO (-), 
GEE (- + ), GEU ( +)] 
INF = the non-oil GDP deflator (and the consumer price in-
dex); 
INFE = expected increase in the non-oil GDP deflator (and the 
consumer price _index); 
INFWL = export price index of the industrialized countries (lag-
ged one year); 
Ml = the money supply as defined by the International Mon-
etary Fund; 
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GEE = expected government expenditures 
GIB = government investment (mainly infrastructure) 
GCE = government consumption (mainly permanent salaries) 
MEE = military expenditures 
GEU = unexpected government expenditures 
GIU = unexpected changes in government expenditure 
GCU =unexpected government consumption 
MEU = unexpected military expenditures 
Empirical Results: 
Impact of government investment on the non-oil price deflator 
(1) INF= 0.89 INFE + 2.64 INFWL + 0.003 Ml - 0.03 YNO 
(8.89) (5.27) (0.03) (- l.50) 
- 0.05 GIB - 0.02 GIU - 0.33 RHO 
(- 2.05) (- 0.34) (- 1.65) 
r2 - 0.999; F = 2770.5; DW = 2.13 
Impact of government consumption on the non-oil GDP deflator 
(2) INF= 0.94 INFE + 2.17 INFWL - 0.005 MI - 0.09 YNO 
(29.19) (14.26) (- 2.03) (- 8.74) 
0.10 GCNPE + 0.04 GCNPELT - 0.83 RHO 
(9.42) (3.75) (- 7.10) 
r2 = 0.999; F = 22550.03; DW = 2.88 
Impact of military expenditures on the non-oil GDP deflator 
(3) INF= 0.81 INFE + 2.02 INFWL 
(9.44) 
- 0.001 MI - 0.02 
(2.65) (- 0.15) (- 1.12) 
+ 0.03 MEE - 0.04 MEU - 0.16 RHO 
• 
YNO 
(0.70) (- 0.79) (- 0.75) 
r2 = 0.998; F = 1959.2; DW = 1.93 
Several interesting patterns appear in the results: 
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1. It is clear that infrastructure investment in Saudi Arabia has reduced 
inflationary pressures. 
2. The transitory (non-infrastructural) component of government investment 
does not appear to have contributed to inflationary pressures over the peri-
od examined ( 1960-85). 
3. World inflation has been imported into Saudi Arabia, and has contrib-
uted significantly to increases in the non-oil GDP deflator. 
4. Contrary to the situation found in many other countries, the money 
supply does not appear to have made an independent contribution to in-
flation. 
5. Government consumption, both permanent and transitory appears to 
have made a major impact on the price level. 
6. Military expenditures appear somewhat neutral m their inflationary 
impact. 
The importance of the composltlon of government expenditures in 
affecting inflation is also illustrated by the fact that the over-all level of 
government expenditures (including both permanent, GEE and transitory 
components, GEU) is not statistically significant in affecting the price level: 
(4) INF= 0.84 INFE + 1.91 INFWL - 0.008 Ml - 0.02 YNO 
(9.88) (3.68) (- 0.91) (- 1.03) 
+ 0.003 GEE + 0.004 GEU - 0.28 RHO 
(1.04) (0.21) (- 1.35). 
r2 = 0.999; F = 2163.5; DW = 1.80 
The results obtained using the consumer price index were very similar 
to those found for the non-oil GDP deflator, and hence do not appear to 
warrant further discussion. 
Impact on Manufacturing • 
The mechanism by which exports could act as an engine of growth (or 
leading sector) and the determinants of the overall impact of an export 
stimulation on the economy is well known. In the classic situation of sta-
ples, exports contributed to economic growth directly (through direct con-
.. 
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tributions to Gross Domestic Product), and indirectly through contributions 
to GDP per medium spread (or carry-over) effects. 
Since oil revenues in the Middle East accrue, for all practical purposes, 
solely to the host governments and in addition have very few linkages to the 
domestic economy, their impact on development largely depends on when 
and how they are spent. As with the classic case of staples, we can concep-
tualize two major impacts on economic development: a direct one through 
the government allocation process for consumption, investment or defense, 
and an indirect one over time where the general increase in non-oil gross 
domestic product stemming from earlier government allocations spreads 
through the economy. 
This indirect contribution to growth embraces Hirschman-type link-
ages, and can broadly be considered as a sequence of multiplier-accelerator 
mechanisms whereby increases in non-oil GDP augment demand for various 
sectoral - manufacturing, services, distribution - outputs. Theoretically, 
indirect contributions (or spread effects) can continue to accrue long after 
some export stimulus has occured. The overall impact of an export stimulus 
on the economy has many determinants including technology, the propensity 
to import, the extent to which ·investment opportunities generated are ac-
cepted domestically, the ability to attract foreign factors and so on. 
Obviously, neither the timing pattern exhibited by, nor the relative 
sizes of, exports' direct and indirect contributions to growth need to be fixed 
and could conceivably vary between subperiods, especially over long periods 
of economic development. Provided that investment opportunities generated 
by the growth of the export sector are exploited, the model predicts that 
economic growth will be a process of industrial diversification around an 
export base. 
Has Saudi Arabian industry been able to diversify around their export 
bases directly, through increases in government expenditures? Or has the 
process of industrial growth stemmed largely from indirect or spread ef-
fects? Do similar patterns exist for the country's other major sectors -
agriculture, construction, trade and services? 
The general form of the equation used to estimate the relative impor-
tance of spread vs linkage effects was of the type: 
MANUF = DUTCH, SPREAD, LINKAGE, CREDIT 
Where: 
1. DUTCH refers to the increase in the relative profitability of non-traded 
goods brought about as a result of oil boom related government expendi-
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tures. This effect is proxied by the expected, INFE and unexpected rates of 
inflation INFU. 
2. SPREAD refers to the increase in demand for output brought about by 
the overall growth of the non-oil sector of the economy, and is depicted by 
the expected YNOE and unexpected YNOU increases in non-oil GDP. 
3. Linkage refers to the link in output to government expenditures and is 
depicted by the expected GE and unexpected GU increases in government 
expenditures. Here government expenditures are government consumption, 
investment, military and total expenditures. As a basis of comparison, pri-
vate consumption both expected PCB and unexpected PCU are included. 
4. CREDIT refers to Saudi Industrial Development Fund, INDCR, and the 
expected rate of commercial bank credit, to the private sector, CBPSPE. 
In general the results for manufacturing (Table 2) indicate that: 
1. Inflationary factors associated with the Dutch Disease have had a consid-
erable retarding effect on Saudi Arabian manufacturing. This is evidenced 
by the negative sign and generally high statistical significance on the ex-
pected inflation term, INFE. Unexpected inflation appears to have had a 
lesser impact. 
2. Spread effects have been considerably stronger than government expendi-
tures in stimulating manufacturing. In fact there is some evidence that the 
crowding out of resources from manufacturing, particularly as a result of 
government investment, has been a major problem in Saudi Arabia. 
3. Private consumption and industrial credit appear particularly important in 
stimulating increases in manufacturing output (Table 2, equation 5). 
As a basis of comparison, similar equations were estimated for the 
agricultural sector (Table 3 ), construction (Table 4 ), trade (Table 5), and 
transport/communications (Table 6). 
The results for agriculture •(Table 3) show some similarities to those 
obtained for manufacturing: 
1. In general inflationary expectations have had a negative impact on the 
growth of the agricultural sector. Since agriculture is also a good traded 
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TABLE 2 
SAUDI ARABIA: EXPENDITURE IMPACT ON MANUFACTURING, 1965-85 
Impact of government consumption 
(1) MANUF = - 1.36 INFE 
(- 4.20) 
+ 0.04 GCE 
(0.19) 
Impact of government investment 
(2) MANUF = 0.o7 INFE 
(0.14) 
- 0.39 GIE 
(- 3.32) 
Impact of defense expenditures 
(3) MANUF = - 1.14 INFE 
(- 2.79) 
- 0.26 MEE 
(- 1.62) 
- 1.57 INFU 
(- 1.90) 
- 0.19 GCU 
(- 151) 
- 0.94 INFU 
(- 1.25) 
- 0.19 GIU 
(- 1.10) 
- 0.76 INFU 
(- 0.76) 
- 0.06 MEU 
(- 0.36) 
Impact of total government expenditures 
(4) MANUF = - 0.62 INFE . - 0.18 INFU 
(- 1.76) (0.23) 
- 0.30 GEE 
(- 3.34) 
- 0.21 GEU 
(- 3.21) 
Impact of private consumption and industrial credit 
(5) MANUF = - 156 INFE - 0.74 INFU 
(- 3.70) (- 5.51) 
+ 0.18 YNOU 
(0.95) 
+ 056 PCE 
(3.62) 
+ 0.79 YNOE 
( 5.03) 
- 0.16 RHO 
(- 0.70) 
+ 0.74 YNOU 
(3.86) 
r2 = 0.996; F = 576.87; DW = 1.97 
+ 0.67 YNOE 
(8.76) 
+ 0.42 RHO 
(2.10) 
+ 059 YNOU 
(5.48) 
r2 = 0.991; F = 246.74; DW = 1.82 
+ 0.91 YNOE 
(8.01) 
+ 0.27 RHO 
(1.28) . 
+ 0.80 YNOU 
(4.97) 
r2 = 0.990; F = 218.49; DW = 1.76 
+ 0.98 YNOE 
(12.33) 
+ 0.12 RHO 
(0.52) 
+ 0.87 YNOU 
(6.87) 
r2 = 0.996; F = 494.21; DW = 1.92 
+ 0.75 INDCR 
(4.46) 
+ 0.41 YNOE 
(2.75) 
+ 0.34 PCU - 0.76 RHO 
(2.62) (- 5.27) 
r2 = 0.998; F = 1062.65; DW = 2.56 
Notes: Estimates were made using a Cochr:ne-Orcutt iterative estimation procedure to 
correct for serial correlation. r2 =coefficient of determination; F = F statistic; DW =Durbin 
Watson Statistic; ( ) = t statistic 
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TABLE 3 
SAUDI ARABIA: EXPENDITURE .IMPACT ON AGRICULTURE, 1965-85 
Impact of government consumption 
(1) AG= - 3.02 INFE 
(- 5.11) 
+ 0.21 GCE 
(0.19) 
Impact of government investment 
(2) AG = - 2.71 INFE 
- (3.62) 
+ 0.04 GIE 
(0.26) 
Impact of defense expenditures 
(3) AG = - 2.89 INFE 
(..:. 7.68) 
- 0.76 MEE 
(- 2.96) 
- 6.94 INFU 
(- 4.57) 
- 0.17 GCU 
(- 1.51) 
- 7.44 INFU 
(- 5.38) 
- 0.15 GIU 
(- 0.34) 
- 3.65 INFU 
(- 2.74) 
- 0.32 MEU 
(- 1.48) 
Impact of total government expenditures 
(4) AGP = - 2.79 INFE - 7.58 INFU 
(- 4.81) (- 5.18) 
+ 0.05 GEE 
(0.27) 
- 0.06 GEU 
(- 0.36) 
+ 0.90 YNOE 
( 3.22) 
- 0.50 RHO 
(- 2.62) 
+ 0.03 YNOU 
(- 0.07) 
r2 = 0.962; F = 55.51; DW = 2.06 
+ 0.68 YNOE 
(5.67) 
- 0.64 RHO 
- (3.81) 
- 0.32 YNOU 
- (1.17) 
r2 = 0.967; F = 63.95; DW = 2.15 
+ 1.22 YNOE 
(8.13) 
+ 0.49 RHO 
(2.51) 
+ 0.63 YNOU 
(2.02) 
r2 = 0.981; F = 113.23; DW = 2.34 
+ 0.66 YNOE 
(3.72) 
- 0.59 RHO 
(- 3.24) 
- 0.25 YNOU 
(- 0.71) 
r2 = 0.996; F = 60.79; DW = 2.06 
Impact of private consumption, expected commercial bank credit 
(5) AGP = - 4.35 INFE - 7.12 INFU + 3.69 CBPSPE - 0.31 YNOE 
'" 
(- 7.32) (- 7.12) (5.63) (- 1.17) 
- 0.33 YNOU 
(- 1.44) 
+ 0.93 PCE 
(4.58) 
+ 0.74 PCU + 0.23 RHO 
(4.42) (1.07) 
r2 = 0.964; F = 46.73; DW = 2.22 
Notes: Estimates were made using ·a Cochrane-Orcutt iterative estimation procedure to 
correct for serial correlation. r2 =coefficient of determination; F = F statistic; DW =Durbin 
Watson Statistic; ( ) = t statistic 
SAUDI ARABIAN INDUSTRIAL DIVERSIFICATION EFFORTS 37 
TABLE 4 
SAUDI ARABIA: EXPENDITURE IMPACT ON CONSTRUCTION, 1965-85 
Impact of government consumption 
(1) CON == Z.32 INFE 
(8.40) 
- 0.36 GCE 
(- 0.24) 
Impact of government investment 
(2) CON = 1.33 INFE 
(4.09) 
+ 0.25 GIE 
(3.25) 
Impact of defense expenditures 
(3) CON= 2.03 INFE 
(8.86) 
+ 0.33 MEE 
(3.13) 
+ 2.23 INFU 
(3.87) 
+ 1.23 GCU 
(155) 
+ 2.30 INFU 
(4.22) 
+ 0.15 GIU 
(1.034) 
+ 1.38 INFU 
(2.07) 
+ 0.02 MEU 
(0.20) 
Impact of total government expenditures 
(4) CON= 1.68 INFE + 1.36 INFU 
(6.76) (2.53) 
+ 0.21 GEE 
(3.40) 
-Impact of private investment 




+ 0.18 GEU 
(4.23) 
+ 2.45 INFU 
(4.54) 
+ 0.17 PIU 
(0.78) 
- 1.32 YNOE 
(- 1.06) 
+ 0.38 RHO 
(- 2.62) 
- 0.90 YNOU 
(- 0.74) 
r2 = 0.984; F = 141.25; DW = 1.67 
- 0.46 YNOE 
(- 0.97) 
- 0.02 RHO 
- (0.07) 
+ 0.75 YNOU 
(0.86) 
r2 = 0.994; F = 384.31; DW = 2.03 
- 0.25 YNOE 
(- 3.50) 
+ 0.08 RHO 
(0.34) 
- 0.16 YNOU 
(- 1.44) 
r2 = 0.993; F = 298.4; DW = 1.88 
- 0.24 YNOE 
(- 4.36) 
+ 0.17 RHO 
(0.77) 
- 0.16 YNOU 
(- 1.90) 
r2 = 0.993; F = 328.79; DW = 1.95 
- 0.60 YNOE 
(- 1.08) 
+ 0.19 RHO 
(0.87) 
+ 0.30 YNOU' 
(0.35) 
r2 = 0.991; F = 233.24; DW = 1.88 
Notes: Estimates were made using a Cochrlfne-Orcutt iterative estimation procedure to 
correct for serial correlation. r2 = coefficient of determination; F = F statistic; DW = Durbin 
Watson Statistic; ( ) = t statistic 
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TABLE 5 
SAUDI ARABIA: EXPENDITURE IMPACT ON 
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE, RESTRAINTS AND HOTELS, 1965-85 
Impact of government consumption 
(1) DIST= - 1.44 INFE 
(- 1.83) 
- 0.28 GCE 
(- 0.63) 
Impact of government investment 
(2) DIST= - 1.71 INFE 
(- 1.58) 
+ 0.11 GIB 
(0.45) 
Impact of defense expenditures 
(3) DIST= - 1.27 INFE 
(- 1.60) 
- 0.13 MEE 
(- 0.47) 
+ 4.46 INFU 
(2.66) 
- 0.18 GCU 
(- 0.76) 
+ 4.34 INFU 
(2.78) 
- 0.40 GIU 
(- 1.15) 
+ 4.02 INFU 
(2.27) 
+ 0.17 MEU 
(0.60) 
Impact of total government expenditures 
(4) DIST= - 1.46 INFE + 3.45 INFU 
(- 1.59) (1.92) 
+ 0.08 GEE 
(0.38) 
- 0.02 GEU 
(- 0.11) 
+ 1.82 YNOE 
(5.10) 
+ 0.35 RHO 
(l.70) 
+ 1.52 YNOU 
(4.34) 
r2 = 0.993; F = 319.77; D = 2.17 
+ 1.66 YNOE 
(10.32) 
+ 0.44 RHO 
(2.18) 
+ 1.49 YNOU 
(6.59) 
r2 = 0.993; F = 315.08; D = 1.90 
+ 1.60 YNOE 
(7.65) 
+ 0.37 RHO 
. (0.34) 
+ 1.36 YNOU 
(4.78) 
r2 = 0.993; F = 302.21; D = 2.13 
+ 1.57 YNOU 
(8.18) 
+ 0.36 RHO 
(1.75) 
+ 1.33 YNOE 
(4.89) 
r2 = 0.993; F = 313.04; D = 2.09 
Impact of private consumption and commercial bank credit 
(5) DIST = 0.09 INFE + 4.01 INFU + 1.00 CBCRP + 1.07 YNOE 
(4.32) (0.13) (3.53) (2.55) 
+ 0.85 YNOU 
(3.49) 
- O.Q3 PCB 
(- 0.12) 
- 0.28 PCU + 0.37 RHO 
(- 1.63) (1.79) 
r2 = 0.997; F = 537.13; D = 1.86 
Notes: Estimates were made using •a Cochrane-Orcutt iterative estimation procedure to 
correct for serial correlation. r2 = coefficient of determination; F = F statistic; DW = Durbin 
Watson Statistic; ( ) = t statistic 
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TABLE 6 
SAUDI ARABIA: EXPENDITURE IMPACT ON 
TRANSPORT, STORAGE, COMMUNICATIONS, 1965-85 
Impact of government consumption 
(1) rsc = - 4.64 INFE 
(- 4.14) 
- 1.73 GCE 
(- 2.96) 
Impact of government investment 
(2) TSC = - 6.65 INFE 
(- 4.18) 
+ 0.88 GIE 
(2.39) 
Impact of defense expenditures 
(3) rsc = - 4.52 INFE 
(- 2.79) 
- 0.31 MEE 
(- 0.70) 
- 5.06 INFU 
(- 2.33) 
- 0.58 GCU 
(- 1.97) 
- 6.27 INFU 
(- 5.75) 
+ 1.64 GIU 
(3.34) 
- 7.69 INFU 
(- 2.91) 
- 0.29 MEU 
(- 0.69) 
Impact of total government expenditures , 
(4) rsc = - 4.01 INFE - 7.97 INFU 
(- 2.41) (- 2.88) 
- 0.18 GEE 
(- 0.52) 
+ 0.06 GEU 
(0.26) 
+ 2.93 YNOE 
(6.16) 
+ 0.50 RHO 
(2.61) 
+ 2.13 YNOU 
(4.76) 
r2 = 0.969; F = 68.38; D = 1.77 
+ 1.91 YNOE 
(7.93) 
+ 0.18 RHO 
(2.82) 
+ 1.02 YNOU 
(3.17) 
r2 = 0.968; F = 66.47; D = 1.86 
+ 2.03 YNOE 
(5.23) 
+ 0.71 RHO 
(4.54) 
+ 1.56 YNOU 
(3.57) 
r2 = 0.903; F = 20.27; D = 1.63 
+ 1.88 YNOE 
(5.41) 
+ 0.65 RHO 
(1.75) 
+ 1.31 YNOU, 
(3.13) 
r2 = 0.927; F = 27.62; D = 1.41 
Impact of private consumption and commercial bank credit 
(5) TSC = - 4.27 INFE - 7.29 INFU + 0.54 CBCRP + 1.26 YNOE 
(2.46) (- 2.77) (- 5.20) (0.78) 
+ 0.91 YNOU 
(1.92) 
- 0.34 PCE 
(0.78) 
- 0.74 PCU + 0.80 RHO 
(2.10) (5.96) 
r2 = 0.917; F = 19.02; DW = 1.79 
_..,.. Notes: Estimates were made using a Cochriuie-Orcutt iterative estimation procedure to 
correct for serial correlation. r2 =coefficient of determination; F = F statistic; DW =Durbin 
Watson Statistic; ( ) = t statistic 
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internationally, Dutch Disease effects are most likely diverting resources to 
other (non-traded) activities in the kingdom. 
2. As with manufacturing, spread effects are considerably more i,mportant in 
affecting output than the direct linkage effects associated with increased 
government expenditures. However, military expenditures are the only ap-
parent source causing a crowding out of resources from the sector. 
3. Credit, but not private consumption have aided agriculture's rather phe-
nomenal growth. 
In contrast to the traded activities examined above, non-traded sectors 
follow a somewhat different pattern: 
1. Construction (Table 4) has been largely stimulated by government in-
vestment and inflation. This is consistent with the non-traded character of 
the sector ·and the direct link of sectoral activity with the government's 
infrastructure programs. 
2. Trade (Table 5) has been largely linked to activity in other sectors _:_ 
spread effects are predominant. While inflation might be expected to have 
drawn resources towards the sector, this appears to be only true in the case 
of unanticipated inflation. · 
3. Transport, Storage and Communication sectors have experienced (Table 
6) a blend of factors responsible for the expansion of the construction and 
trade sectors. Inflation has drawn resources towards these activities as their 
profitability most likely increased relative to traded activities. While the 
direct links to government investment have been important, spread effects 
have been particularly strong elements affecting this sector's output. 
Conclusions 
The main thrust of the analysis undertaken above has been to assess 
the possibility of reduced goverQment expenditures as a way of overcoming 
the deflationary effects associated with falling oil revenues and the need for 
sustained austerity in public sector expenditures. ·Particular attention has 
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through altering the composition (but not necessarily level) of public sector 
expenditures. · 
With regard to the government's infrastructure program, one can only 
conclude that the Saudi Arabian development strategy, based largely on the 
assumptions of a Hirschman type unbalanced growth strategy greatly overes-
timated the willingness of entrepreneurs to shift resources to manufacturing 
as costs of production fell. Put differently the Saudi Arabian private sector 
does not appear interested in investing in fixed plant and equipment solely 
as a result of the Hirschman-type cost reducing linkages stemming from the 
public sector's infrastructure led development strategy. 
On the other hand, the demand creation or spread effects stemming 
from the government's infrastructure led investment program has been suc-
cessful in creating a non-inflationary environment, which in turn has tended 
to stem the potential flow of resources out of the sector and into non-traded 
activities. 
Clearly, private sector demand still remains to a certain extent a 
function of government expenditure. 
It appears however 17 that private sector demand is likely to remain 
reasonably buoyant even with lower government expenditures because a 
significant portion of the demand is financed by past savings. This seems to 
confirm the more optimistic observations of certain Gulf officials that the 
fall in oil revenues and in government expenditure may have set in motion 
some degree of cure for any Dutch Disease problems that remain. 
As the Economist Intelligence Unit notes: 18 
It is something of a truism to say that private capital steers clear of inflationary situations, 
but it may yet come to have considerably more relevance in the Gulf than in any sophistry 
involved in breaking oil revenue into component income and capital parts. With the 
easing of the governments pull on the availability of manpower, services and goods, and 
with a greater emphasis on efficiency in both the oil and government sectors, the costs of 
doing business have fallen, and the returns have become more predictable. 
The results presented above are consistent with the Intelligence Unit's 
assessment that the willingness of the Gulf private sector to repatriate 
incremental income derived from past government spending, or to liquidate 
foreign currency deposits held in local banks to finance investment in indus-
try or even to fund certain government projects will be crucial over the next 
few years. The private sector needs r~assurance that the government will 
not engage in policies likely to initiate another round of inflation. 
17 LooNEY (1987 /88). 
18 
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (1988a, p. 17). 
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In terms of government expenditures themselves, the results presented 
above suggest that all efforts should be made to shift allocations from 
consumption to the Saudi Industrial Development Bank. In this sense the 
recent decline in government sponsored lending activity (Table 1) must be 
reversed if industrial output is to sustain another phase of expansion. 
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EFFICACIA DEGLI SFORZI DI DIVERSIFICAZIONE INDUSTRIALE DEL-
L'ARABIA SAUDITA: CONSEGUENZE DI UNA DIMINUZIONE DELLE 
SPESE PUBBLICHE 
Scopo principale di questo articolo e di esaminare le conseguenze della 
riduzione dei ricavi petroliferi per l'economia dell'Arabia Saudita. In particolare, 
l'articolo esamina varie strategie di austerita alternative che si aprono al governo. 
I principali risultati sono che ii programma del governo di investimenti in 
infrastrutture si e rivelato deludente nello stimolare l'investimento del settore 
privato. D'altra parte, la creazione di domanda o gli effetti collaterali originati dal 
programma di investimenti in infrastrutture ha avuto successo nel creare un 
ambiente non inflazionistico. Questo a sua volta ha avuto la tendenza a dirigere ii 
flusso potenziale di risorse fuori da questo settore. Evidentemente, la domanda 
del settore privato rimane ancora in certa misura una funzione della spesa 
pubblica. 
In termini di spese pubbliche, i risultati qui presentati suggeriscono che si 
dovrebbero intensificare gli sforzi per spostare le disponibilita dal consumo verso 
la Banca per lo Sviluppo Industriale dell'Arabia Saudita. 
